Home Ownership and Unemployment: A Panel Data Study on Australia by Nguyen, Kerstin & Nilsson, Anton
	          
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOME OWNERSHIP & UNEMPLOYMENT: 
A Panel Data Study on Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics    Authors: Kerstin Nguyen & 
Master of Science in Business and Economics      Anton Nilsson  
Master’s Thesis     Supervisors: Klas Fregert &  
June 2014                 Fredrik NG Andersson 
 
 
	  
 
Title: Home Ownership and Unemployment – A Panel Data Study on 
Australia 
 
Authors: Kerstin Nguyen & Anton Nilsson 
 
Supervisors: Klas Fregert & Fredrik NG Andersson 
 
Course: NEKN05 – Master of Science in Business and Economics,  
30 ECTS credits 
 
Date:  2014-05-28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Home ownership has for long been welcomed and subsidized across most 
Western countries. Earlier macro studies on the linkages between home ownership 
rates and unemployment rates have shown a fairly strong support of the Oswald 
hypothesis. However, these results have been contradicted by micro level 
evidence on the topic. In this paper the Oswald hypothesis will be analysed by 
conducting a panel data study on Australia. Earlier methodological issues of 
endogenous home ownership rates will be reduced by using instrumental variables 
methods to partly control for the issues that have shed doubt in earlier findings. 
The obtained results are in support of the Oswald hypothesis, and indicate that a  
1 % increase in home ownership rates are followed by an increase of 0.1 - 0.3 % 
in unemployment rates. The paper also finds evidence of a strong link between 
trade union membership rates and unemployment rates. The results implicate that 
a 1 % increase in the trade union membership rate is followed by a 0.15 - 0.25 % 
increase in unemployment rates. No matter what mechanisms lie behind the 
findings it is sufficing to say that economies benefit from a highly mobile 
workforce and that housing markets that are not flexible enough will prevent 
workers’ to be mobile and move to where the jobs are.  
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: the Oswald hypothesis, home ownership, unemployment, 
 panel data, Australia   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation	  
Home ownership has for long been welcomed and subsidized across most 
Western countries. The favourable tax treatments with regards to home ownership 
combined with the exceptionally low interest rates after the 2008 financial crisis 
has made home ownership a very attractive and achievable alternative for the 
common man of today. Home owners are often associated with greater local 
engagement, more investment in their local communities and children that 
perform better in school (Dietz & Haurin, 2003). However, despite these benefits 
there may be potential costs of home ownership as well, something that will be 
examined in this paper. When you buy a home you are effectively putting down 
roots in your local community. Hence, imposing geographical restrictions on 
future employment opportunities. The high transaction costs of switching homes 
and the fact that people may be unable or unwilling to sell at market prices in 
economic downturns makes home owners less mobile than renters. The effects 
might be even more severe in countries where family ties and ties to your local 
community are highly important than in more “individualistic” countries. 
Furthermore, countries with high safety nets in terms of benefits when becoming 
unemployed, should be more affected by too high home ownership rates since 
people then may have the financial possibility to stay unemployed longer and look 
for jobs in their neighbourhood instead of being “forced” to move.  
This lack of mobility, in terms of being limited to search for jobs within 
commuting reach may be a significant explanatory factor to varying 
unemployment rates in developed countries. The importance of workers’ mobility 
depends largely on the geographical structure of the country of interest. Large 
countries with huge distances between important job centres and worse 
infrastructure should be much more vulnerable to having workers with a lower 
mobility than small well-connected countries. The linkage between home 
ownership rates and unemployment rates was first investigated by Oswald (1996), 
a paper which gave name to the Oswald hypothesis; suggesting a positive link 
between home ownership rates and unemployment rates.  
In this paper the Oswald hypothesis will be revisited by conducting a panel 
data study on Australia. So far no macro level studies of this kind have been done 
on Australia, although it is one of few countries that has kept records of home 
ownership rates on a regional level over an extensive time period. The dataset at 
hand makes it possible to study the effect of evolvements over time in home 
ownership rates on a regional level and its linkages with labour market outcomes 
in the respective region. Earlier research on the area has with few exceptions 
shown a positive link between home ownership rates and unemployment rates on 
a macro level. Thus, creating doubts upon the somewhat uniform approach of 
promoting home ownership in developed countries. However, the relationship to 
this date is poorly evaluated mostly due to scarce recordkeeping of regional home 
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ownership rates, but also due to methodological issues when examining the data 
available.  
 Australia is one of few exceptions where regional home ownership rates have 
been recorded over the last 20 years, making it a perfect candidate for an 
extensive panel data study in line with Oswald and Blanchflower (2013) who 
conducted a similar study on the USA. Furthermore it is a large country with a 
sparsely allocated population and long distances between job centres, why labour 
force mobility should be of utmost importance for Australia. In addition to further 
evaluating the Oswald hypothesis in a previously unexplored setting, this paper 
will also reduce earlier methodological issues of endogenous home ownership 
rates by using instrumental variables methods to partly control for these issues 
that have shed doubt in earlier findings. The obtained results are in support of the 
Oswald hypothesis and indicate that a 1 % increase in home ownership rates are 
followed by an increase of 0.1 - 0.3 % in unemployment rates. The paper also 
finds evidence of a strong link between trade union membership rates and 
unemployment rates. The results implicate that a 1 % increase in the trade union 
membership rate is followed by a 0.15 - 0.25 % increase in unemployment rates.  
1.2 The Housing Market in Australia 
Home ownership is in general more desirable and common in comparison to 
private rental in Australia. This is because owning a property is seen as an 
efficient way of building wealth, and compared to renters home owners have 
larger security of tenure and more freedom over their dwellings. Moreover, as 
owner-occupied housing is considered as a private good rather than an 
investment, home owners are not obliged to pay tax on their housing returns (e.g., 
capital gains taxes). However, unlike many other Western countries Australia 
does not have any interest rate deduction scheme for home loans. Anyhow, home 
ownership is usually being considered more profitable than renting (ABS, 2013; 
Australian Residential Property Planners, 2014; CBA, 2009; Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2008; eChoice, 2014; Irvine, 2014). High-income Australians with their 
higher marginal tax rates and normally more expensive houses with larger capital 
gains and higher imputed rents, are those who benefits the most from tax 
exemptions. Thus, the current tax system is not as beneficial for home buyers as it 
is for current home owners (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). Being a renter on 
the other hand can also be advantageous since you are more flexible to move 
elsewhere and you can invest in other assets that could gain higher profits. 
Furthermore, as housing prices are rising, choosing to buy a house rather than rent 
is no longer a certainty (CBA, 2009; GPG, 2014).  
The Australian property market has been performing well in recent years. The 
escalating property prices could be explained by the lack of property supply and 
as mentioned above, a tax regime that benefits existing property owners (Dennes, 
2014). Despite being one of the most expensive countries to live in, the demand 
and residential construction are continuously rising in Australia (AHURI, 2014; 
CBA, 2009; GPG, 2014; Property Wire, 2014). The population growth over the 
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past ten years could be a possible explanation for the strong demand for both 
purchasing and renting properties (HIA, 2013). While the housing construction is 
growing more rapidly in bigger cities, with Sydney and Melbourne being 
examples, the growth of housing construction in other cities is less or not growing 
at all. Hence, the demand for inner city apartments is greater than the demand for 
apartments in smaller cities (Dennes, 2014).  
Since housing prices are increasing, as mentioned earlier, people are more 
willing to rent a property rather than buying one. There has been a strong growth 
in the Australian private rental market over recent decades and as of 2011, 23.4 % 
of the Australian households privately rent their housing. At the same time a 
gradual decline has been seen in home ownership rates that were around 68 % in 
1994 and reached 66 % in 2014 (ABS, 2014). Because many renters cannot afford 
entering the housing market, long term renting is not unusual. In fact, about one 
third of all private renters are long-term renters (defined as people who rent for 
more than ten years continuously) (AHURI, 2014; Australians for Affordable 
Housing, 2011; Just Landed, 2014).  
The net gain or loss of population through the movement of individuals from 
one state or territory of residence to another over a given time period, known as 
the net interstate migration (NIM), has been growing in the past several years. 
From 2009-2010 to 2010-2011 it increased with 2 %. Between 2010-2011 and 
2011-2012 and from 2011-2012 to 2012-2013 the NIM increased with 0.3 % and 
1.8 % respectively. Regarding the net overseas migration (NOM), which is the net 
gain or loss of population through migration to Australia and emigration from 
Australia, annual rates have also been rising. There was a rise of 24.8 % from 
2010-2011 to 2011-2012 and during 2011-2012 to 2012-2013 the NOM grew with 
8.6 % (ABS, 2013). The improvement of regional mobility seen over the last 
years in Australia may have something to do with the increased importance of the 
private rental market and the overall decline in home ownership rates seen over 
the last decades. 
Because the tax regime has encouraged people to own a property, the number 
of people investing in properties has escalated, resulting in accelerating property 
prices and housing costs and creating difficulties for first home buyers to enter the 
property market (Dennes, 2014). In order to help first home buyers with 
purchasing or constructing their first home, the Australian Federal or State 
Government introduced the so-called First Home Owners Grant (FHOG) in 2000. 
Only those who fulfill the eligibility criteria can receive this grant (Government of 
South Australia, 2014; Government of Western Australia, 2013; NAB, 2014; 
NSW Government, 2013; State Government of Victoria, 2013). A First Home 
Owner Boost Scheme was also implemented with the purpose of increasing the 
grants for first home buyers during a limited time period (NAB, 2014). Programs, 
services, benefits, payments, grants and funds provided by the Australian 
Department of Social Services (DSS) are other ways of assisting first home 
buyers and making housing more available. One example is the Housing 
Affordability Fund, which was a five year $500 million investment established in 
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2008 to reduce housing costs for new home buyers (Australian Government, 
2008; DSS, 2014; LGA, 2008; Renwick Living, 2011). The government also 
gives housing assistance to the rental sector through programs such as the CRA 
Program (a demand-based tax free income supplement), the Private Rent 
Program (helps low-income households that have difficulties with securing or 
maintaining their rents), and the National Rental Affordability Scheme (designed 
to make housing more available for low- and moderate income households 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013; DSS, 2014; Government of 
Western Australia, 2014).  
To sum up, with its lack of capital gains taxes the housing market in Australia 
should in theory be more flexible than in countries where transaction costs of 
moving residency are higher. However, with one of the world’s highest property 
prices the dream of becoming a homeowner is hard to attain for the people of 
Australia, especially since there are no interest rate deductions as in many other 
developed economies (such as Sweden). As home ownership has become more 
and more expensive, Australia has seen a decline in home ownership rates over 
the last decades and consequently a rise in importance of the private rental 
market. Today almost one fourth of the households in Australia are private 
renters. According to the underlying theory of this paper, this development should 
be associated with a movement towards a more mobile workforce and possibly 
lower unemployment rates, which will be analysed later on in this paper.  
The study is divided into six different sections. The next section will introduce 
earlier research on the topic followed by section 3, which describes the 
methodology used in this study. In section 4 a description of variables and data 
will be provided and section 5 will present the empirical results. The last section 
of the study presents the conclusion, discussion and policy implications. 
 
 
2    Hypothesis and Literature Review 	  
This section introduces the hypothesis of the interactions between home 
ownership rates and unemployment. Furthermore, a brief overview of results from 
earlier empirical studies and the methodological issues faced by most researchers 
in this area will be provided.	  	  
Research on a potential destructive effect of too high home ownership rates on the 
labour market began in the 1990s when Andrew J. Oswald (1996) wrote “A 
Conjecture on the Explanation for High Unemployment”. In order to prove his 
hypothesised connection, Oswald performed cross-sectional regressions of 
unemployment rates and home ownership rates for regions in the UK, Sweden, 
France, Italy and the US. The findings implied that a 10 percentage point increase 
in home ownership rate in one region was associated with nearly 2 percentage 
points higher unemployment rates. Both pure cross-sectional models and 
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correlations between yearly changes in home ownership and unemployment were 
performed. According to Oswald, this positive relationship between home 
ownership and unemployment arises due to home owners’ lower mobility and 
lower willingness of moving in search for jobs compared to private-sector renters. 
Reasons such as high costs faced by homeowners regarding buying, financing and 
selling a house could be an explanation for this outcome. Effects from too large a 
share of owner-occupied housing could according to Oswald also lead to less 
business activity in that region and/or a decline in consumption, particularly for 
those home owners with loans. Since cross-sectional regressions of this kind often 
lead to nonsense correlations, Oswald later developed his research towards using 
panel data and more researchers around the world followed in his footsteps. 
Oswald’s argument that a higher share of home ownership causes a higher 
unemployment, known as the Oswald hypothesis, led to further studies both on 
macro levels and on micro levels. In the former case, studies performed in for 
example Germany (Lerbs, 2010), New Zealand (Cochrane & Poot, 2007) and 
Finland (Laamanen, 2013) show similar findings as the ones found by Oswald. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive study on a macro level was the one conducted by 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) where the authors used a fixed effects panel 
data model to pin down the effect of rising/declining home ownership rates using 
data on American states during a 25-year period. The results indicated that the 
long-term elasticity seemed to lie between one and two. Put differently, in the 
long run, doubling the rate of home ownership would result in more than a 
doubling of the unemployment rate. In addition, the lags between cause and effect 
were found to be long. According to his results it could take up to four years for 
the effect of a rise in home ownership to affect the labour market. 
Conversely, micro level studies usually find contradicting results where home 
owners tend to be associated with better labour market outcomes than renters 
(Coulson & Fisher, 2008; Flatau et al., 2003; Flatau et al., 2002; Munch et al., 
2003; Taskin & Yaman, 2013;). In these studies, probit models and duration 
models are used to pin down the differences in risks of being unemployed and 
length of unemployment spells between home owners and renters. The results 
mostly point to the fact that home owners have lower risks of becoming 
unemployed, and in addition, shorter spells of unemployment than renters. One 
exception being Taskin and Yaman (2013) who found evidence in support of the 
Oswald hypothesis in the US after controlling for endogeneity of home 
ownership.  
The only known study that tries to find evidence that were in conjunction with 
both micro and macro level findings was executed by Jani-Petri Laamanen 
(2013), “Home-ownership and the Labour Market: Evidence from Rental Housing 
Market Deregulation”. The author shows using a natural experiment that home 
owners on the micro level are less likely to be unemployed, but at the same time, 
those living in regions with high home ownership rates are more likely to be 
unemployed than others. Laamanen uses micro data between 1990 and 1992, 
when a reform that encouraged private renting was implemented in Finland. The 
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reform had a strong effect on regional home ownership rates and could therefore 
be used as an instrument to isolate the causal effect of regional home ownership 
rates. When the instrumental approach was used, the marginal effect of a higher 
regional home ownership rate on risk of being unemployed was almost the double 
compared to the result where the instrument was not used. The author argues that 
this finding was an implication of a possible simultaneity issue causing downward 
biased parameters between home ownership rates and unemployment rates due to 
the fact the direction of causality between the two may run in both directions. 
High unemployment rates may lead to lower demand of owner-occupied housing 
and low unemployment rates have the opposite effect, thus implicating an inverse 
relationship in the opposite direction of causality. The results from Laamanen’s 
study show that a 1 percentage point rise in home ownership in a region leads to a 
9 percentage point higher risk of being unemployed. 
The methodological issues faced on the area are not restricted to the possible 
double causality between the variables of interest. Measurement errors in home 
ownership rates are another methodological issue that gets magnified especially in 
empirical approaches where fixed effects panel data models are used. 
Measurement errors may cause further downward bias in the estimates of the 
home ownership variable, and thus further magnifying the downward bias due to 
simultaneity (Hsiao, 2003). The common approach trying to mitigate the 
simultaneity issue has been to use lags of home ownership rates in the modelling 
attempts (for example Cochrane & Poot, 2007). The issue of measurement errors 
has not gotten the same attention in earlier studies. In general, most studies rely 
on the fact that home ownership rates are not endogenous as it is hard to come by 
external instruments that can isolate the effect of exogenous changes in the 
housing market with the exception being Laamanen (2013). Therefore the 
question is to what extent earlier macro evidence is spurious or whether the 
linkages in fact have been underestimated in previous studies. 
The diverging results from previous literature have led to discussion about the 
possible mechanism underlying the patterns shown in the data. It is of general 
belief that, in comparison to renters, homeowners are less willing or unable to 
relocate to areas where possibilities of finding a new job could be greater. This in 
turn makes them less mobile than renters all else being equal, resulting in possibly 
longer unemployment spells. However, the micro evidence showed that this was 
not the case; in fact homeowners were associated with shorter unemployment 
spells (for example Munch et al., 2003). The discussion about these contradicting 
micro and macro evidence has therefore led towards the belief that home 
ownership has effects above and beyond the effects on the individual level 
(externalities). While home owners are less likely to experience unemployment, 
external effects counteract the positive effects of home ownership on the 
aggregate level (Laamanen, 2013). Laamanen also proposed some plausible 
mechanisms behind these externalities such as consumption reductions due to 
mortgage financed home purchases. Also, home owners are more likely to be 
indebted with home loans, and therefore more vulnerable in the event of 
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becoming unemployed (Lerbs, 2010; Schmid, 2010). This may imply that 
homeowners have lower reservation wages resulting in an increased local job 
competition and possible displacement effects on other individuals. Furthermore, 
as the rental market in a region becomes smaller, it is harder to attract talent from 
other locations due to their issues in finding a place to reside. Yet, as the research 
area is relatively new the linkages between the housing and labour market are still 
poorly understood. Lastly, a useful review of the above mentioned studies and 
other relevant studies on the area is provided in Table 2.1 (see Appendix A).  
 
3    Methodology 	  
This section briefly explains the econometric techniques and principles employed 
in this paper. A brief overview of the notion of stationarity and methods of testing 
this assumption will be included. Furthermore, the section provides an overview 
of how to choose an appropriate panel data model, and a more detailed 
introduction of the panel data models used in the analysis. 
3.1   Stationarity 
Granger and Newbold (1974) showed that if ordinary OLS methods are applied to 
non-stationary data, one is highly likely to obtain very misleading estimates of the 
parameters of interest. This situation is known as spurious regression, where the 
OLS results show a strong link between variables even though there may be no 
relationship between them at all. Although the original research on spurious 
regressions was intended for time series models, the notion of spurious 
regressions can be applied to a panel data setting as well. There has been 
numerous research papers on the impact of non-stationary variables in a panel 
data setting, and since the time series are averaged over more than one cross-
sectional unit in a panel, the problem of non-stationarity is not as damaging as in 
the single time series case. When the number of cross-sections is smaller and the 
time series dimension gets larger it becomes more important to test for stationarity 
to avoid possible spurious results (Hsiao, 2003, p. 298; Verbeek, 2012, p. 410). 
The dataset in this paper contains fewer cross-sections and more time 
observations making it necessary to check for non-stationarity in the data. There 
are a numerous set of tests for stationarity available today with different structures 
depending on the assumptions you are willing to make about the data at hand. 
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) propose a test where the null hypothesis is that each 
time series contains a unit root, and an alternative that each time series is 
stationary. This test is however restrictive because it assumes that the unit root 
process is the same across the cross-sections. Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 
propose a less restrictive test where they allow the unit root process to differ for 
the cross-sections. The test is conducted by averaging the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test statistics across cross-sections. Hence, allowing for different 
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orders of serial correlation and different unit root processes for each cross-section. 
The general ADF test equation looks like Equation 1:  
 
 
1.     ∆!it = !!i,t-1 + !1∆!i,t-1 + !2∆!i,t-2 + !3∆!i,t-3 + !k∆!i,t-k + !it 
 
 
The parameter in front of the sequence in levels will be tested in order to find out 
if it is equal to zero, such that the process must be described entirely in first-
differences. Under the null hypothesis, the only non-stationary part of the 
equation above is the level variable. Thus, it makes sense that this variable should 
not appear in the equation under the null. A high average test statistic across the 
cross-sections therefore implies stationarity and vice versa. Another intuitive 
explanation for the reason of testing if ! is equal to zero is that there is no 
correction mechanism towards a long run mean if the yt  sequence tend to meander 
away. There is also a Fisher type test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) that is 
based on combining the p-values from the ADF test on each cross-section. Thus, a 
similar approach as the test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin. All tests described 
above require cross-sectional independence, which is a strong assumption to make 
in macroeconomic contexts. However, there are ways to deal with this issue, for 
example by assuming that the cross-sectional dependence is following a common 
trend across cross-sections. Therefore the issue might be mitigated by subtracting 
period means across cross-sections from each individual observation to eliminate 
a possible trend common to all cross-sections. 
Furthermore, there are three different approaches to testing for unit roots. The 
simplest but also most powerful test (most likely to reject a false null hypothesis) 
is one where no constant and no deterministic time trend is included in the test 
equation. The ADF test equation then looks exactly as Equation 1 above. After 
visual inspection of the series in levels, there may be reason to include either a 
constant or a deterministic time trend in the test equation if the mean of the series 
tend to evolve in a certain direction over time. The testing procedure starts with 
determining whether each individual panel series contains a unit root in levels or 
not; if it does, the series will be differenced once to make it stationary. Also, in 
certain occasions it is necessary to difference the series once more to make it 
stationary. The series is then said to be integrated of order one and two 
respectively. Examining relationships between variables of different order of 
integration is often pointless (Enders, 2009, p. 199). This explains why the first 
step in any study on time series data and panel data with a long time dimension 
should be to determine the order of integration of the variables, and if needed, 
making the necessary adjustments to ensure that every variable are integrated of 
the same order. 
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3.2   Panel Data Model Selection	  
3.2.1 Static Panel Models	  
Panel data models can in general be divided into two subsections; static and 
dynamic models of which the static models do not contain a lagged dependent 
variable as in dynamic models. The dynamic models are a bit more advanced, and 
will be explained in more detail after the concepts regarding static panel models 
have been introduced. The first necessary assumption to make regarding the data 
is whether or not the dependent variable is a random sample from an identical 
population. A pooled panel model combines the data from all cross-sections and 
assumes that there is no systematic time independent component that 
distinguishes the different cross-sectional units. This is an illogical assumption to 
make when handling regional unemployment models, since the average 
unemployment over time indeed in most cases differs between different regions. 
This is also the case for Australia where some regions are highly industrialized 
urban areas and some are less developed rural areas. It would therefore be of use 
to include a single intercept for every region to account for such time independent 
regional differences in unemployment. This model is called a LSDV model (Least 
Square Dummy Variable model). 
In addition to the cross-sectional fixed effects, period specific fixed effects 
might be incorporated into the fixed effects model. If unemployment is assumed 
to follow the business cycles in a similar way across the regions, it would be of 
use to account for these time specific effects by including single intercepts for 
every time period in the model. If these business cycle effects are not accounted 
for, it may also result in biased estimates of the parameters of interest, should 
these variables be correlated with the business cycles. 
The need to include cross-sectional or period fixed effects can be tested with a 
redundant fixed effects test that uses an F-statistic to check if the cross sectional, 
period or both fixed effects are contributing to the explanation of the dependent 
variable. The null hypothesis in such a test is that all cross-sectional or period 
dummies are zero versus the alternative that at least one of these differs from zero. 
Another common approach to remove fixed effects is to use a model in first-
difference (FD model). Since it is assumed that the fixed effects are time 
independent, this manipulation will remove the fixed effects in a similar manner 
as the LSDV model. 
3.2.2 Dynamic Panel Models	  
In many cases the dependent variable of interest depends highly on past 
realizations of itself. Periods with high unemployment are usually very persistent 
and it will take time for the level of unemployment to reach its long-term 
equilibrium level again. If a static model produces highly autocorrelated residuals, 
it might be needed to add a lagged dependent variable to account for the 
persistence in the dependent variable. Also, if the lagged dependent variable is 
wrongly omitted and correlated with any of the other explanatory variables, 
biased parameter estimates may be the result. A problem of biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates arises when estimating such a model with an 
ordinary LSDV or first-difference approach as shown by Nickell (1981). The 
direction of the bias is always negative, resulting in too low estimates of the 
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parameter for the lagged dependent variables (see Nickell, 1981). If the other 
regressors are correlated with the lagged dependent variable it will result in biased 
estimates for their parameters as well, why it is important to try and overcome this 
issue. The problem of Nickell Bias is easiest shown in the FD model context 
where a lagged dependent variable is added to the model as Equation 2: 
 
 
2.  yit − yi,t−1 = γ(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) + β xit( xit − xi,t−1) + uit − ui,t−1 	  
 
Since the realization of the lagged dependent variable depends on the error term in 
time period t-1, there is correlation between the error term and the repressors, 
resulting in biased estimates. The problem is not solely present in FD models but 
also in LSDV models. The bias gets smaller as the number of time periods in the 
sample goes to infinity, but may in this case be quite sizable, which requires 
finding a way to overcome this bias (see Verbeek, 2012, p. 397). There are two 
main approaches to overcome the Nickell bias where the simplest one is an IV 
approach as proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) that uses past levels or 
differences of the y sequence as instruments for the lagged dependent variable. 
For instance, the second or third lagged levels of the y sequence do not depend on 
uit-1, but may be highly correlated with (yit-1 - yit-2). Thus, these may serve as a valid 
instrument if there is no severe autocorrelation in the differenced residual. 
An extension of the Anderson-Hsiao approach may also be used in a GMM 
estimation framework as shown by Arellano and Bond (1991). They argued that a 
more efficient estimator could be found by using more available instruments of 
the lagged dependent variables either in differences or in levels. In addition, the 
other variables of the model can be instrumented if they are presumed to be 
endogenous. The fact that causality between home ownership and unemployment 
may run in both directions suggests a possible simultaneity problem. Also, the 
frequent problem of downward biased parameter estimates caused by 
measurement errors in FE and FD models may be significantly reduced by 
instrumenting the variables, which are assumed to suffer from large measurement 
errors (Hsiao, 2003, p.305). By using the Arellano-Bond method it is possible to 
instrument home ownership with past levels or differences of itself to reduce the 
simultaneity bias and the measurement error bias. This works if it is assumed that 
previous observations of home ownership are uncorrelated with future error terms 
(i.e. that future measurement errors are uncorrelated with past recordings of home 
ownership rates and that past home ownership rates are not simultaneously 
determined with future unemployment rates). In comparison to an ordinary FE or 
FD model, assuming that this exogeneity restriction holds, more consistent 
estimates of the true parameter might be found. Of course the instruments must 
also have a strong first-stage effect on the instrumented variable. In fact, the only 
difference between the Arellano-Bond method and 2SLS is the choice of 
weighting matrix. The one step weighting matrix will be used later on, which 
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implies that the two methods are equal, allowing interpretation of the model and 
its assumptions in the same manner as in 2SLS (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, 
p. 746). 
Although the original Arellano-Bond approach was intended for panels with a 
large number of cross-sections and a smaller time dimension, later research 
showed that the estimator is also consistent as both the number of cross-sections 
and time series dimensions tend to infinity (Alvarez & Arellano, 2003). However, 
as the time series dimension gets larger the number of instruments might need to 
be restricted, since observations too far back in time may have a very weak 
correlation with present observations (Roodman, 2009; Verbeek, 2012, p. 404). 
To handle the unobserved fixed effects, either the differencing approach as in the 
Anderson-Hsiao method can be used, or orthogonal deviations that subtracts the 
average of all available future observations from the current value for every cross-
sectional series to take the fixed effects into account. The differencing approach 
will be used later on. 
There are two main specification tests for the GMM approach, namely to check 
for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals (first-order serial correlation in 
the residuals in Equation 2 is expected as both differenced residuals will contain 
ui,t-1). Nevertheless, second-order serial correlation is unwanted as this implies 
autocorrelation in the level equation and would make the proposed instrument 
invalid. Second, Sargan test will be used, which tests whether the remaining 
instruments after having assumed that all the necessary instruments are valid, are 
correlated with the error term. It is therefore a somewhat weak test of the 
exogeneity restriction, where common sense must be used in order to validate 
exogeneity of the necessary instruments. If the model passes these tests there is no 
reason to assume that the instruments are invalid, and the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimator will in this case provide consistent parameter estimates. Furthermore, it 
must be ensured that the instruments have a strong first-stage effect on the 
instrumented variable, which can easily be tested by examining t- or F-statistics 
from the first stage regression. Lastly, the exclusion restriction may be tested by 
including the instruments directly in the original model. A more detailed overview 
of these methods can be found in Hsiao (2003) or Verbeek (2012). 
 
4.  Variables and Data 	  
In this section the variables chosen to model regional unemployment rates will be 
described in more detail. Having outlined the structure and relevance of the 
variables, the general panel model will be specified. Thereafter the data source 
will be reported followed by a section testing for stationarity. Finally, some 
descriptive statistics and correlations will be reported. 
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Unlike research using for example unemployment benefits or labour taxes to pin 
down differences in unemployment between countries, such standard approaches 
are not of interest in the context of explaining regional unemployment differences, 
as they are not varying across regions (even if there are such differences they will 
be incorporated in the intercept of a LSDV model). Since this study has chosen a 
fixed effects approach, all non-time varying determinants of regional 
unemployment will be incorporated in the intercept. It is therefore important to 
choose explanatory variables that are likely to evolve over time within regions. 
Because the purpose of this paper is to explicitly find the linkages between 
unemployment and home ownership, another goal when choosing control 
variables has been to find variables that are likely to be correlated with both of the 
above, this to reduce the issue of omitted variables bias. Following this reasoning 
the following explanatory variables are included along with regional home 
ownership rates: 
 
Proportion of Trade Union Members of Total Workforce (T) 
That trade union participation rates affect the wage bargaining between employers 
and employees, such that disequilibrium may take place in the labour market, is a 
well-known economic concept. To capture different evolvements over time in the 
strength of trade unions between regions, this variable is chosen as a possible 
determinant of regional unemployment rates. The expected relationship between 
the trade union participation rate and unemployment is positive. 
 
Proportion of People in the Age Bracket 15 - 34 (Y) 
Demographic patterns may evolve differently across regions over time and is also 
a well-known determinant of unemployment. As younger people have a weaker 
position on the labour market it is expected that the relationship between this 
variable and unemployment is positive. It is also highly likely that there is a 
correlation between the regional age structure and regional home ownership rates, 
why this variable is of great importance to the model. The expected coefficient 
sign is positive. 
 
Proportion of People in the Age Bracket 45 - 64 (O) 
In the age bracket 45 - 64 people usually have their strongest position on the 
labour market. Having reached such an age, people are also more likely to be 
home owners, why this variable fits the criteria very well. The expected 
coefficient sign is negative. 
 
Percentage of People Over 15 years of Age with a Bachelor Degree (BD) 
This variable is self-explanatory; a better educated workforce is associated with 
both lower unemployment rates and potentially higher home ownership rates. The 
expected coefficient sign is negative. 
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Percentage of People Born Overseas (BO) 
To capture the effects of different immigration rates between regions, this variable 
is included to control for the potential relationship between the rate of people born 
overseas and unemployment. It is also highly likely that there is a connection 
between this measure and home ownership rates. The expected coefficient sign is 
negative. 
 
People Working in Manufacturing (as a percentage of total workforce) (M) 
This variable controls for the sectorial structure of the region. Though there may 
not be an apparent link between this variable and home ownership rates, it will 
still be included in the analysis as it may be strongly correlated with 
unemployment rates. The importance of trading industries (export-oriented 
industries) to the employment situation in a region is most likely strong, see for 
example Porter (2003). 	  
Having specified the full set of control variables it is now time to outline the full 
model. As pointed out by Oswald (2013), a possible explanation as to why the 
linkages between home ownership and unemployment are so little known is the 
long time lags between cause and effect. In this modelling attempt, lags of the 
home ownership rates will therefore be used to ensure that no possible linkages 
over a larger time span are missed out on. Of course for each and every further 
lag, observations are lost and the issue of multicollinearity gets magnified, why 
the number of lags are restricted to two. The full model will look like this: 
 
 
3.  Unemployment rate in a region (Uit) = Ui,t-1+ regional intercept dummiesi 
+ control variablesit + regional homeownership ratesit (from lag 1 to lag 2) + 
time period dummiest + eit 
 	  
Where i is the regional index and t is the time index and eit is the stochastic error 
term. Here the unemployment rate is modelled as an autoregressive process where 
it depends on its last recorded value as well as regional time invariant effects, 
national business cycle effects as recorded in the time period dummies, the lags of 
home ownership rates and the control variables as specified above. The model 
above is an LSDV model with both time period and cross-sectional fixed effects 
accounted for. In a first step static LSDV models will be run, excluding the lagged 
dependent variable. In the second step the lagged dependent variable will be 
added to the LSDV model. The third step will be to correct for the Nickell bias 
and possible endogeneity of home ownership rates as explained in the 
methodology section by using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation approach. 
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4.1 Data Source	  
The data is solely collected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Regional 
home ownership rates were available from the year of 1994 until 2011 from the 
publication ”Housing occupancy and costs”. For the years of 1998, 2001, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013 no estimates of regional home ownership rates 
were available, why values for these years had to be interpolated using a simple 
linear interpolation method (for 1998 the value was interpolated as the mean of 
the estimate in 1997 and 1999 and so on). Details on survey size, standard errors 
of the estimates and more can be found in (”Housing occupancy and costs”, ABS, 
2014). Regional unemployment rates were collected yearly from 1994 to 2013 
from the Macrobond database (which in turn collects their data from ABS). Data 
on trade union membership rates, proportion of young people and proportion of 
old people were available for every year during the time span 1994 - 2013 with 
the simple exception of there being no estimate on trade union membership for 
2013 (this was interpolated as the value of 2012). As for the proportion of people 
working in manufacturing data was missing for 2002-2006 as well as for 2013 
(here linear interpolation techniques had to be used as well to fill out the missing 
data). Regional data on people born overseas and proportion of people with a 
bachelor degree is only collected every fifth year, why missing values had to be 
interpolated as well using the same linear interpolation techniques. Exact 
descriptions of the data and where to find the data for future regressions can be 
found by navigating the website of ABS, the relevant surveys are listed in the 
reference section of the paper. 
4.2 Stationarity Testing	  
As pointed out in the methodology section, the first step in any study on time 
series data should be to determine the order of integration of all variables used. 
The case of panel data is no different, especially when the number of cross-
sections is small and the number of time period observations is large. In this 
section three commonly used tests are chosen to formally test whether or not the 
variables are stationary. All tests rely on cross-sectional independence, a very 
strong assumption to make when dealing with macro data. The cross-sectional 
dependence will be assumed to be the result of a common national time trend, 
which is a reasonable assumption bearing in mind that the study is working with 
aggregate macro variables. To remove the cross-sectional dependence from the 
individual panels the data is averaged over cross-sectional units for each time 
period, the period specific element is thereafter subtracted from the data yielding 
(yit* = yit – (Sum(yit))/N), where (Sum(yit))/N is the mean value for variable ”y” 
across all regions in each specific time period. The time trend that is common to 
all regions will therefore be removed from the data. Thereafter, the adjusted data 
can be used to test for unit roots  (see Enders, 2009, p. 246). 
Having dealt with the cross-sectional dependence, the deterministic 
components to include in the test equation must be chosen. Since the paper is 
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dealing with ratios or percentage rates, a deterministic time trend seems 
unreasonable to include as it implies that the variables will reach above or under 
100 % and 0 % over time. After visually inspecting the data there was a tendency 
for the mean of the individual series to evolve in certain directions over time. 
Therefore, an intercept or drift term is included in the test equation. Under the null 
hypothesis the variable contains a unit root, and non-stationarity can therefore not 
be ruled out. The p-values for each test and for each variable is reported in Table 
4.1, full test results are to be found in Appendix B. 
 
Table 4.1: Panel unit root test results.	  Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                 Source: ABS 
 
Unit Root 
 Test Results 
Levin, Lin & 
Chu 
Im, Pesaran & Shin 
W-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
Square 
Home Ownership (H) 0.0024*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Unemployment (U) 0.0509* 0.0158** 0.0386** 
Bachelor Degree (BD) 0.6646 0.9889 0.9810 
Born Overseas (BO) 1.0000 1.0000 0.9826 
Manufacturing (M) 0.9804 0.9994 0.9824 
Old People (O) 0.1297 0.5085 0.0916* 
Trade Union (T) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Young People (Y) 0.1233 0.6465 0.1752 
 
 
The tests suggest that the two main variables of interest, which are home 
ownership rates and unemployment rates, are stationary and no further adjustment 
is needed to make them stationary. Additionally, trade union membership rates 
seems to be stationary, meaning that this variable can be used in levels from now 
on. The rest of the variables are clearly non-stationary and the necessary 
adjustments must be made to make sure that they will not complicate the 
modelling attempts. As has been pointed out in the methodology section, first-
differencing the data will in most cases make it stationary and to confirm that this 
is the case for these variables, the same unit root tests will be run for the variables 
in first-differences. The p-values for the unit root tests of the non-stationary 
variables after differencing are shown in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: Panel unit root in first-difference test results. Note: calculations made in      
EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Unit Root Test Results, 
First-difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran & 
Shin W-stat 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
Square 
D_Bachelor Degree (BD) 0.7566 0.8848 0.9713 
D_Born Overseas (BO) 0.8422 0.5147 0.3197 
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Unite Root Test Results, 
First-difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu Im, Pesaran & 
Shin W-stat 
ADF – Fisher Chi 
Square 
D_Manufacturing (M)  0.0000*** 0.0000***  0.0000***  
D_Old People (O) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
D_Young People (Y) 0.1413 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 
 
Even after differencing, both BD and BO do not pass the test, but the rest of the 
variables are now stationary (Y do not pass the LLC test but passes the less 
restrictive IPS and Fisher tests). At this stage, the relevance of including BD and 
BO as control variables is questioned. Twice differencing the data will result in 
losing a lot of information and it is hard to justify from a theoretical viewpoint 
that the ”difference in the difference” of BD and BO will have anything to do with 
unemployment rates in levels. Furthermore, most of the data was interpolated for 
these two variables in the first place, making it hard to draw reliable conclusions 
using these variables in differences. It therefore makes sense both from a 
theoretical and statistical viewpoint to drop these variables completely. From now 
on, only M, O and Y will be used in first differences and H, U and T in levels. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 	  
To get a first sense of the looks of the data and the possible linkages between the 
variables of interest simple descriptive statistics, correlations and pooled 
regressions of the variables will be introduced. 	  	  
Table 4.3: Australian national averages of chosen variables during a 20-year period. 
Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Unemployment 0.061 0.019 0.027 0.11 160 
Home Owners 0.678 0.061 0.448 0.759 160 
Manufacturing 0.061 0.024 0.0159 0.103 160 
Born Overseas 0.223 0.06 0.10 0.41 160 
Bachelor Degree 0.146 0.061 0.071 0.34 160 
Old People 0.233 0.023 0.155 0276 160 
Young People 0.294 0.0285 0.231 0.374 160 
Trade Union 0.238 0.064 0.13 0.43 160 
 
The table above describes the national averages over the 20 year time period. The 
average unemployment rate was around 6 %, whilst the average home ownership 
rate was around 68 %. The national unemployment rate was around 9.3 % in 1994 
and has declined to around 5.6 % by 2014. The same gradual decline can be seen 
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in home ownership rates that were around 68 % in 1994 and reached 66 % in 
2014 (ABS, 2014).  
 
Table 4.4: Correlation between home ownership and unemployment. Notes: calculations 
performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Correlation Home Ownership 
Unemployment 0.2798 	  
Table 4.5: Cross-sectional pooled regression results. Notes: calculations performed in 
EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Dependent variable: 
Unemployment rate 
Coefficient Std. error P-value 
Constant 0.001571 0.016415 0.9239 
Home Ownership Rate 0.088381 0.024121 0.0003 
 
Switching the focus towards the linkages between the two measures, a positive 
correlation between home ownership rates and unemployment rates is found when 
the entire dataset over the whole sample period is pooled. A simple pooled OLS 
regression in the same manner further supports the positive link between the two 
variables. This finding surprisingly contradicts earlier studies, which often finds a 
negative connection between the two in this simple cross-sectional setting (see for 
example Lerbs, 2010). To see the pattern graphically the average unemployment 
rates for each region is plotted against the average home ownership rates (average 
over the entire time dimension) and indeed the same pattern arises here. The 
relationship looks very similar to the plot of the average unemployment rate 
against the average home ownership rate between 2010-2012 for the EU 
countries, but the opposite relationship is found for US states and Swedish 
counties using rates for 2012. 
 
 	  
Figure 4.1: Relationship between home ownership and unemployment in Australian 
regions and EU countries. Notes: calculations performed in Excel. 
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between home ownership and unemployment in states in the US 
and Swedish counties. Notes: calculations performed in Excel. 	  
Conclusions of the linkages cannot be drawn at this stage, since cross-sectional 
relationships of this kind are highly likely to produce nonsense correlations due to 
the heterogeneity of regions or countries. For instance, countries or regions with a 
high home ownership rate tend to be more economically prosperous in the first 
place, and may therefore have lower average unemployment rates, which may be 
a reason as to why cross-sectional studies have tended to find a negative linkage 
between the two variables. The opposite may be the case for the EU union where 
countries that were severely hit by the financial crisis such as Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, and financially weaker Eastern European countries such as Romania, 
Bulgaria and Hungary, have very high home ownership rates (Eurostat, 2012). 
With panel data however, it is possible to isolate the linkages within each 
homogeneous region and therefore substantially reduce the issue of heterogeneity. 
 
 
5    Panel Model Results 	  
Having tested the variables for stationarity and made the necessary adjustments to 
make sure that the variables enter the model with the same order of integration, 
the models described earlier in the ”panel data model selection” section are now 
ready to be run. To start the empirical analysis, the most basic static LSDV model 
with period and cross-section fixed effects will be estimated. Thereafter, this 
model will be developed into a dynamic one, and lastly an attempt to try and 
mitigate possible biased parameter estimates will be made by using the Arellano-
Bond approach.	  
5.1   Static LSDV Model 	  
After testing for stationarity, it was concluded that it would be best to drop BD 
and BO from the model. Additionally, M, O and Y had to be first-differenced 
before running the regression. Bearing this in mind the final LSDV model will 
look like Equation 4: 
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4.  Uit = regional dummiesi + time period dummiest + β1Hit-1 + β2Hit-2 + 
β3Tit + β4D_Mit + β5D_Oit + β6D_Yit + eit 
 
 
Here the regional unemployment rates are modelled as a function of regional time 
invariant intercepts, time period specific national business cycle effects, former 
regional home ownership rates, the trade union participation rate and the year-to-
year difference of the proportion of people working in manufacturing, the 
proportion of old people as well as the proportion of young people. All variables 
have been formally tested for non-stationarity and there is no evidence of non-
stationarity for any of these variables. In the model specification (i) stands for the 
cross-section index, (t) stands for the time period index, (D_) indicates that the 
variable has been differenced and eit is the stochastic error term. White period 
standard errors are used to allow for cross-sectional clustered serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Only the most relevant findings will be 
reported here. For a full regression table, please turn to Appendix C of this paper. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Static panel least squares model results with period and cross-section 
dummies. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Static LSDV Model results Coefficient White Period Std. Error P-Value 
Home ownership(-1) −0.0097 0.0273 0.7220 
Home ownership(-2) 0.0978 0.0861 0.2581 
D_Manufacturing 0.2608 0.271 0.3380 
D_Old people 0.0831 0.0573 0.1499 
D_Young People −0.0156 0.0452 0.7314 
Trade Union 0.1433*** 0.0296 0.0000 
Adj. R-Squared 0.8630   
Durbin-Watson Stat 0.6980   
Redundant fixed effects test 0.0000***   
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the coefficient estimates are quite unsatisfying. 
Twice lagged home ownership rates have the expected coefficient sign, but the 
standard error is large, making the coefficient insignificant. Manufacturing, Old 
People and Young People all have the opposite coefficient sign as compared to 
what was expected. Trade Union Membership rates enter with the expected 
coefficient sign and is highly significant. To check if the cross-section and period 
fixed effects are significant, a redundant fixed effects test was performed, where 
the null was strongly rejected. 
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The test checks if all cross-section specific and time period specific dummies 
are significant as a whole. The results suggest that the fixed effects dummies are 
correctly included in the regression. Therefore a pooled model approach would 
not be of interest in this case. The most disturbing result from this static LSDV 
model can be seen from the extremely low Durbin-Watson statistic. The Durbin-
Watson test for panels, tests if there is first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The rule of thumb is to conclude that there is positive first-order autocorrelation in 
the residuals when the Durbin-Watson statistic is much smaller than 2 (see 
Verbeek, 2012, p. 391). OLS is still consistent in this case, but the standard errors 
will have to be corrected by using a robust standard error calculation approach. 
The White Period standard errors are therefore used to make the necessary 
adjustments when estimating the standard errors with residuals that are correlated 
within each cross-section. To further show the autocorrelation pattern, the 
correlogram of the residuals will also be reported. Here each estimated residual is 
simply regressed on former estimated residuals to pin down the autocorrelation 
pattern. The test regression is specified below and is followed by the correlogram 
table that reports the PAC, which are the corresponding coefficients for each 
lagged residual in the auxiliary regression. The q-stat and p-value that tells 
whether or not all lagged residuals up until lag (i) (where i simply indicates lag 1, 
2, 3 and 4) are significant as a whole are also reported: 
 
 
êit = c + êit-1 + êit-2 + êit-3 + êit-4 
 
 
Table 5.2: Correlogram of residuals for static LSDV model. Notes: calculations 
performed in EViews. Source: ABS 	  
Correlogram PAC Q-stat P-value 
1st 0.651*** 62.218 0.0000 
2nd -0.070* 83.943 0.0000 
3rd -0.163* 86.377 0.0000 
4th -0.086* 86.746 0.0000 
 
As expected from the low Durbin-Watson statistic the correlogram also suggests 
strongly autocorrelated residuals. Here the p-value for the first lagged residuals 
indicates that the AR(1) term is highly significant with a positive coefficient of 
0.651. Even though all of the PAC: s are significant at the 10 % level it seems as 
though most of the autocorrelation issues may be resolved by appropriately 
dealing with the AR(1) process in the residuals. Instead of trying to quick fix the 
issue only by using robust standard errors the residual autocorrelation issue will 
be dealt with in the next section when estimating the dynamic models. 
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5.2   Dynamic LSDV Model	  
As can be seen in Table 5.2, the autocorrelation in the static model seem to be 
concentrated of the first order, why the inclusion of the first order AR(1) term in 
the model might be enough to resolve the autocorrelation issue. Not only is this a 
statistical judgement but also a theoretical one. It seems unreasonable that 
unemployment rates are not persistent and highly dependent on former 
realizations in its nature, something that was noted by Oswald and Blanchflower 
in their 2013 study. They also included a lagged dependent variable in their 
modelling attempts of the regional unemployment rates in the US. This section 
runs a similar model as in the above mentioned study. However the results from 
this section should serve more as a reference or baseline for the upcoming GMM 
models since the estimators are inconsistent due to Nickell Bias (Verbeek, p. 397). 
The period and cross-sectional fixed effects are included just as in the static model 
and the same set of control variables as well. Yielding the full dynamic 
specification as in Equation 5: 
 
 
5.  Uit = β1Uit-1 + regional dummiesi + time period dummiest + β2Hit-1 + 
β3Hit-2 + β4Tit + β5D_Mit + β6D_Oit + β7D_Yit + eit  
 
 
The regression results are given in Table 5.3: 
 
Table 5.3: Dynamic panel least squares model results with period and cross-section 
dummies. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Dynamic 
LSDV Model (1 lag) Coefficient 
White Period 
Std. Error P-value 
Unemployment(-1) 0.7508*** 0.0486 0.0000 
Home ownership(-1) 0.0108 0.0221 0.6266 
Home ownership(-2) 0.0432* 0.0254 0.0909 
D_Manufacturing −0.374** 0.1150 0.0015 
D_Old people 0.0184 0.0447 0.6818 
D_Young People −0.0534** 0.0266 0.0471 
Trade Union 0.0634*** 0.0118 0.0000 
Adj. R-Squared 0.9415   
Durbin-Watson Stat 1.6371   
 
 
The results from the dynamic LSDV model show, as expected, that the lagged 
dependent variable enters very significantly, and with a relatively high parameter 
indicating a high persistence in unemployment rates. Switching the focus towards 
the other parameters, it can be seen that the increased explanatory power in the 
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dynamic model and the lower autocorrelation in the residuals has reduced the 
standard errors of all parameters. The twice-lagged home ownership rates are now 
significant at the 10 % level, but the parameter is fairly low. A 10 % increase of 
home ownership rates should according to this model lead to a 0.4 % increase in 
unemployment rates (to clarify; if homeownership rates were to rise from 60 % to 
70 % the result implies that this would be associated with with a 0.4 % increase in 
unemployment rates). However the persistence will result in home ownership 
rates having a long run effect on unemployment of (0.0432/(1-0.7508)) = 0.1733. 
Hence, the results are in fact of economic significance as it implies that a 10 % 
increase in home ownership rates would be associated with almost a 2 % increase 
in unemployment rates. Still, the results are not statistically significant enough to 
draw any reliable inference on the regression above, especially as the Nickell bias 
has not yet been dealt with. However, it can be confirmed that the lagged 
dependent variable should be included in the model. To further check whether the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable helped in getting rid of the 
autocorrelation issue, the correlogram of the residuals from this model is plotted 
as well. The correlogram is shown in Table 5.4: 
 
Table 5.4: Correlogram of residuals from the dynamic LSDV model with one lagged 
dependent variable. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 	  
 
Correlogram PAC Q-stat P-value 
1st 0.171** 4.2819 0.039 
2nd −0.041 4.2992 0.117 
3rd −0.048 4.7647 0.190 
4th −0.072* 5.9185 0.205 
 
The correlogram looks more pleasing. However, there is still some 
autocorrelation, particularly for the first lagged residual leading to inconsistency 
of OLS when having a lagged dependent variable (see Verbeek, 2012, p.141). A 
second lag of the dependent variable will therefore be added to the model, 
yielding results as shown in Table 5.5: 
 
 
Table 5.5: Dynamic panel least squares model results with period and cross-section 
dummies. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
Dynamic 
LSDV Model (2 lag) Coefficient 
White Period 
Std. Error P-Value 
Unemployment(-1) 0.931*** 0.0505 0.0000 
Unemployment(-2) −0.2438*** 0.0531 0.0000 
Home ownership(-1) 0.0150 0.0265 0.5715 
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Dynamic 
 LSDV Model (2 lag) 
Coefficient White Period 
Std. Error 
P-Value 
Home ownership(-2) 0.0403* 0.0210 0.0576 
D_Old people 0.0002 0.0425 0.9967 
D_Young People −0.0311 0.0287 0.2803 
Trade Union 0.0703*** 0.0157 0.0000 
Adj. R-Squared 0.9452   
Durbin-Watson Stat 2.0325   
 
As seen in Table 5.5, nothing much changes when adding the second lag of 
unemployment rates to the model. The parameters have the same sign and similar 
magnitudes, however the standard errors for home ownership shrinks even further 
and Home Ownership(-2) is now almost significant at the 5 % level. The 
persistence in unemployment rates is not as high when adding the second lag. 
Instead of being around 0.75 in the one lag model it is now (0.931-0.2438) = 
0.6872. The long run parameter of twice lagged home ownership rates is in this 
case: (0.0403/(1-0.6872)) = 0.127, thus slightly lower than in the previous model.  
There is however further issues to resolve. The Nickell bias is present in this 
model, which must be mitigated in the following models. Furthermore, the 
possible endogeneity of home ownership rates due to simultaneity or 
measurement errors will be dealt with by using appropriate instrumental variables 
techniques. It must however be noted that the model at this stage looks fairly 
reasonable. On the other hand, Verbeek (2013) shows that the Nickell bias can be 
quite sizable even for moderate time dimensions, why the results from Table 5.3 
and Table 5.5 should serve more as a baseline for the next section. Anyhow, the 
long run parameter for home ownership rates is strikingly close to the stylized fact 
that a 1 % increase in home ownership rates is associated with a 0.2 % increase in 
unemployment rates as proposed by Oswald (1996). In the next section a GMM 
approach will be used to investigate whether there will be any significant change 
in the magnitude of the homeownership parameter by using methods to control for 
endogeneity and Nickell bias.  
5.3   Arellano Bond GMM Model	  
The methodology section of this paper briefly described the possible bias of the 
lagged dependent variable when estimating a dynamic LSDV or FD model and 
the most common approaches to overcome this issue. The Anderson-Hsiao 
approach that uses lagged values of the lagged dependent variable as instruments 
for itself was introduced as a possible solution to this so-called Nickell bias. 
However, this method will not be of any help if the purpose is to control for 
endogeneity in some of the other regressors. The Arellano-Bond method was 
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introduced as an extension of the Anderson-Hsiao approach where more 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable might be used as well as for other 
regressors that are assumed to be endogenous. Moreover, the model will be 
estimated using GMM. The main purpose of this section is therefore not only to 
control for the Nickell bias, but to evaluate whether or not home ownership rates 
are endogenous and, if that is the case, in what direction the bias may be. 
Most earlier studies on the linkages between home ownership rates and 
unemployment rates have acknowledged the possibility of double causality or 
measurement errors in home ownership rates that may invalidate the consistency 
of the estimates in a normal LSDV model. It is widely known that measurement 
errors are more harming in a LSDV model than in an ordinary OLS models, as the 
part of variation in the explanatory variable due to measurement errors is larger 
when using deviations from means instead of the all variation in the data (see for 
example Hsiao, 2003, p. 305). The bias induced by measurement errors often 
leads to too low and insignificant estimates of the parameter of interest. In other 
words, there tends to be attenuation towards zero of the explanatory variable when 
measurement errors are present. Furthermore, the simultaneity bias arises in 
theory because the demand for owner-occupied housing depends largely on the 
situation of the labour market. High unemployment rates may lead to lower 
demand of owner-occupied housing and low unemployment rates has the opposite 
effect. In theory, it will therefore be expected that this simultaneity will further 
downward bias the estimates of home ownership rates due to the negative 
correlation in the opposite causality direction. However, by lagging home 
ownership rates in the first place the problem should not be too severe. The 
simultaneity issue is mentioned and controlled for in the paper by Laamanen 
(2013) where the author used a natural experiment of the deregulation of the 
housing rental market to evaluate the possible endogeneity bias of home 
ownership rates. Indeed his suspicion of the possible downward bias due to 
measurement errors and simultaneity was proved right and his instrumental 
variables approach more than doubled the magnitude of the parameter for home 
ownership rates. 
Other studies have been aware of the possibility that the relationship found 
between home ownership rates and unemployment rates may be underestimated, 
but the issue of finding appropriate instruments have resulted in no further 
attempts to overcome the problem other than that of Laamanen. In absence of 
appropriate external instruments, internal instruments will instead be used here to 
control for measurement errors and simultaneity. This approach is based upon the 
assumptions that earlier recordings of home ownership rates are uncorrelated with 
future error terms. Therefore, it must be assumed that the measurement errors are 
uncorrelated over time. Also, it will be assumed that the simultaneity as well as 
the issue of omitted variables  decreases when lagging home ownership rates even 
further. To limit the number of instruments for home ownership rates, the lags to 
be used as instruments will be restricted to the second lag for each observation. 
For the lagged dependent variable, the third lagged level of unemployment rates 
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will be used as instrument. The rest of the variables are assumed to be exogenous 
and will instrument themselves. The estimation procedure is the one step GMM 
procedure and the standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the same manner as earlier models. The fixed effects are 
handled by the first- differencing method. The regression results for this model 
with one lagged dependent variable is shown in Table 5.6. Full output results are 
reported in Appendix D.  
 
Table 5.6: One step panel GMM model results (1 lagged dependent variable). Notes: 
calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
One step 
GMM Model (1 lag) Coefficient 
White Period Std. 
Error P-value 
Unemployment(-1) 0.5552*** 0.1041 0.0000 
Home ownership(-1) 0.0483 0.0307 0.1187 
Home ownership(-2) 0.1425*** 0.0299 0.0000 
D_Manufacturing −0.1964 0.1776 0.2713 
D_Old people −0.0283 0.0374 0.4520 
D_Young People −0.0017 0.0282 0.9518 
Trade Union 0.0621** 0.0292 0.0358 
J-test 0.3069   
2nd order serial 
correlation test 
0.0956*   
 
There are two major changes in the results compared to earlier LSDV models. 
First, the magnitude of the parameter for the lagged dependent is significantly 
smaller and second, the parameter for twice lagged home ownership rates is 
significantly larger. The fact that the lagged dependent variable coefficient is 
smaller was not expected since the Nickell bias is supposed to be downwards in 
the LSDV model. The fact that home ownership grew in magnitude and became 
much more significant was expected, as it was assumed to be downward biased 
due to the possible endogeneity of it. The long run effect of Home Ownership(-2) 
is (0.1425/(1-0.5552)) = 0.3204, which is almost a doubled effect as compared 
with the dynamic LSDV model with one lagged dependent variable. 
For the model to be valid it must be ensured that the model passes the J-test 
and the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation in the residuals. 
The J-test checks whether the overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with 
the residuals (also known as Sargan test). The relatively large p-value from this 
test tells that there is no evidence in support of these instruments being correlated 
with the error term. Secondly, it must be ensured that there is no second-order 
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autocorrelation in the residuals, as this will imply that the instruments used are 
invalid. The fairly low p-value of this test is quite worrisome as it may invalidate 
the exogeneity restriction of the instruments, but the null of no second-order 
autocorrelation cannot be rejected at the 5 % level. All in all, the model looks 
fairly satisfying at first glance. Yet, the fact that the home ownership rates enters 
with such high magnitude and that the lagged dependent variable is so much 
lower than previous models deserves further attention.  
Next a second lagged dependent variable is added to see whether the second 
order autocorrelation test could be improved and to see if the parameter estimates 
changed. Here it is assumed that Unemployment(-2) is uncorrelated with the error 
term,, why it will instrument itself (more on the theory behind this assumption is 
found in the methodology section earlier in this paper). The results from this 
specification are given in Table 5.7: 
 
Table 5.7: One step GMM model results with period dummies and first-differences 
transformation (2 lagged dependent variables). Notes: calculations performed in 
EViews. Source: ABS 
 
One step GMM Model (2 
lags) Coefficient 
White Period Std. 
Error P-value 
Unemployment(-1) 0.7338*** 0.0846 0.0000 
Unemployment(-2) −0.1805** 0.0794 0.0250 
Home ownership(-1) 0.0526** 0.0224 0.0203 
Home ownership(-2) 0.1238*** 0.0265 0.0000 
D_Manufacturing −0.2599 0.1780 0.1471 
D_Old people −0.0385 0.0371 0.3008 
D_Young People −0.0062 0.0347 0.8594 
Trade Union 0.0675** 0.0320 0.0372 
J-test 0.3230   
2nd order serial 
correlation test 
0.4526   
 
The results did not change much and the combined persistence in unemployment 
is very similar to the one lag model more precisely: (0.7338-0.1805) = 0.5533 and 
the long run effect of Home Ownership(-2) is therefore (0.1238/(1-0.5533)) = 
0.2771, a bit lower than in the last model, but still a far higher magnitude than in 
the dynamic LSDV models. Als,o the second-order serial correlation test looks 
more pleasing when adding a second lag of unemployment to the list of 
explanatory variables. 
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5.4   Robustness Checks 	  
The last step in evaluating the validity of the GMM results will be to run a set of 
robustness checks to see whether the results stay stable over different model 
specifications. Furthermore, there is serious doubt of the result from the GMM 
models in Table 5.6 and 5.7. First, due to the fact that the lagged dependent 
variable parameter shrinks as opposed to the expected direction of the Nickell bias 
(see Nickell (1981)), second, the parameter for home ownership gets largely 
magnified. Therefore this section is dedicated to evaluating the validity of these 
results. 
 The fact that the model passed the J-test only implies that the instruments are 
most likely exogenous, which is good. However, the fact that the instruments 
must have a strong first-stage effect on the instrumented variables has not been 
evaluated yet. Weak instruments can lead to very misleading and biased results 
(Verbeek, 2012, p. 165). Verbeek also mentions that the GMM estimators may be 
very sensitive to a change in the number of instruments when these are weak. 
Therefore, a good robustness check can be to experiment with different 
instruments (Verbeek, 2012, p. 171).  
As mentioned in the methodology section related to this topic, the GMM 
estimation method used in this paper is the same as running 2SLS. The first-stage 
may then be appropriately checked by running the first-stage regression (where 
the endogenous variables is used as dependent and all instruments plus all 
exogenous variables as independent) just as in 2SLS. A commonly used rule of 
thumb is to check whether the F-statistic on the instruments in this first-stage 
regression is above ten to ensure that the instruments explains a lot of the 
variation in the endogenous variables (Verbeek, 2012, p. 165). The bias due to 
weak instruments is in many cases towards OLS (or in this case towards the 
GMM results without instruments), and as more weak instruments are added, the 
closer to OLS it should get (see Roodman, 2009). However, if there is a 
combination of weak instruments and a violation of the exclusion restriction 
(meaning that the instruments explain the dependent variable directly or is 
correlated with the error term) it might lead to a strong positive biased 2SLS 
estimate, particularly if the first stage effect is fairly low (for further details see 
Wooldridge, 2008, p. 515). A last robustness check should therefore be to include 
the instruments directly in the model and see whether they themselves should be 
included as regressors. The first-stage F-statistics, which is simply calculated as 
the square of the t-statistic of the instrument in the first-stage regression will be 
reported in Table 5.8. The rest of the robustness checks that were performed will 
be reported in Appendix E. Here, the following regression was run to check the 
first-stage effect: 
 
D(U) = C + U(-2) +  D(T) + D(D_M) + D(D_O) + D(D_Y) + D(H(-2)) 
+ D(H(-3)) 
 
D(H) = C + D(H(-2)) + D(T) + D(D_M) + D(D_O) + D(D_Y) + U(-2) 
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Where D(*) is the first difference operator and D_(*) means that variable * is 
already first-differenced once before entering the difference operator once more. 
This is just an indicator for the first-stage since all instruments are not included in 
these first-stage regressions. Still, it is important to check whether the second 
lagged level of unemployment rates and the second lagged difference of home 
ownership rates are correlated with its presumed endogenous counterparts.  
 
Table 5.8: First stage F-statistics for instruments used in GMM. Notes: calculations 
performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
First stage F-statistics for instruments used in 
GMM (Squared t-statistic from the respective 
regression shown above) 
F-statistic 
U(-2) 29.15 
D(H(-2)) 39.19 	  
The first stage F-statistics are well above the ”10 limit” as was the rule of thumb 
when evaluating the instrument relevance condition. But the fact that lagged 
levels of the unemployment rates may violate the exclusion restriction because 
this instrument itself affects the independent variable (most likely in a negative 
direction since high levels of unemployment rates are likely to be associated with 
negative future differences in unemployment rates and vice versa), may be the 
reason as to why the estimated persistence parameters in the GMM (1 and 2 lag) 
models seemed to be downward biased. Therefore, the models were run by using 
lagged differences instead of levels as instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable. Here, the results were more in line with the expected magnitude of the 
parameter for the lagged dependent variable and the parameters for home 
ownership rates were pretty much unchanged (see Table 5.18 in Appendix E). 
More robustness checks in the form of changing the instrument count and 
evaluating the exclusion restriction were also run. The general conclusion from 
these tests is that the instruments for home ownership rates may be violating the 
exclusion restriction as well. However, this is not a big of a problem since this 
further strengthens the assumed view of a positive link between the two (the 
excluded instruments are of a positive magnitude when included in the 
regression). Additionally, as more instruments are added, the results go towards 
the ones in the Dynamic LSDV model as expected, but the J-test gets rejected in 
these cases.  
To check whether the coefficients for home ownership rates are robust to 
changes in the list of exogenous covariates the models were run without any 
exogenous covariates resulting in no significant change in the parameters for 
home ownership. Lastly, the GMM model was run by using the second and fourth 
lag of hom eownership rates and treating these as exogenous (they are of such 
deep lags that the simultaneity issue should not be a big problem) with two 
different kinds of instrument specifications for the lagged dependent variable. The 
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results were more in line with the expected direction of bias for the lagged 
dependent variable, although the coefficient for homeownership shrank to a long 
run effect of about 0.10 (see Table 5.23 in Appendix E for these results). All the 
above mentioned robustness checks are reported in Appendix E. 
Summing up, the results from Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 should be cautiously 
evaluated as they do not seem to be entirely robust. On the other hand, the results 
obtained in this paper  generally suggests that the true parameter of home 
ownership rates should lie somewhere in between the static LSDV estimates and 
the GMM estimates (i.e., a long run parameter of somewhere in between 0.1 and 
0.3).  
6.  Concluding Remarks 
If too high homeownership rates have negative effects upon the labour market, 
serious doubt arises upon the uniformly encouraging policies towards home 
ownership in developed countries. Thorough investigation is therefore needed to 
pin down not only the effects of home ownership on an individual level but the 
aggregate effects on a macro level. A lot of serious economic issues have its roots 
in the housing market such as the financial crisis in 2008, where the housing 
market bubble in the USA collapsed. Still, today there are many potential threats 
for the housing markets in many Western countries such as Sweden and Norway, 
where housing prices have risen to very high levels. The promotion of home 
ownership due to various tax incentives in combination with the low interest rates 
of today makes home ownership the most financially attractive alternative of 
tenure for those with resources to afford it.  
This paper investigates the possible negative effects when too many 
individuals become home owners, not by looking at the effects on housing prices, 
but on the structural effects it may have on the mobility of the workforce and 
therefore on unemployment rates. A panel data set covering 19 years of regional 
unemployment and home ownership rates in Australia is used to model the 
relationships between the two. The results of this paper gives further macro 
evidence to the Oswald hypothesis of a positive link between home ownership 
and unemployment after controlling for covariates as well as simultaneity and 
measurement errors in home ownership rates. The results from a static model only 
controlling for fixed effects, period effects and covariates suggests a positive but 
insignificant link between the two. When developing the model into a dynamic 
one, and controlling for Nickell bias, as well as possible endogeneity of home 
ownership rates, the relationship gets magnified suggesting that simultaneity 
or/and measurement errors may work towards underestimating the effect of 
regional home ownership rates on unemployment rates. The results from these 
models indicates that a 1 % increase in home ownership is associated with a 0.2 % 
- 0.3 % increase in unemployment rates, thus is of strong economic importance. 
These results were however not entirely robust, but the evidence of this paper 
suggest that the link between the two is positive and statistically significant. 
Something that in itself should be worrying for policy makers given the fact that 
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the large amount of subsidies with regards to promoting home ownership may be 
of better use elsewhere.  
The results also show a strong positive link between trade union strength and 
unemployment. As in every empirical study the tricky part is to difference 
between causality and nonsense correlations. Earlier macro studies on the linkages 
between home ownership rates and unemployment rates have shown a fairly 
strong support of the Oswald hypothesis. However, these results have been 
contradicted by micro level evidence on the topic. The question is then whether 
the macro level evidence is spurious, the micro level evidence is spurious or 
whether the micro and macro level evidence can be true at the same time. The 
macro level evidence in support of the Oswald hypothesis have now been found in 
a variety of countries such as USA (Oswald & Blanchflower, 2013), Germany 
(Lerbs, 2010), New Zealand (Cochrane & Poot, 2007), and here in Australia 
under different econometric specifications suggesting that the results may not be 
spurious after all. One possible explanation as to why macro studies could be 
spurious may result from the fact that five year lags of home ownership rates 
often are used in the analysis, for example in Oswald and Blanchflower (2013) 
and Cochrane and Poot (2007). The strong correlations appearing in these studies 
may be the result of underlying business cycles implicating that home ownership 
rates rise in periods of economic growth and are followed by higher 
unemployment rates five years later during economic contractions. This paper 
finds linkages that are shorter than in the previous mentioned studies, more 
exactly the linkages arise already after two years suggesting that the business 
cycle counter-argument should not be valid in this case.   
Additionally, it cannot be assumed that the micro level evidence is spurious 
(even though many of these studies may suffer from significant omitted variables 
bias (Taskin & Yaman, 2013)). Home owners generally seem to be associated 
with better labour market outcomes. Still, the micro level evidence is disputable 
since studies controlling for endogeneity of home ownership are few, and the ones 
that do are not as opposing to the Oswald hypothesis (for example Taskin & 
Yaman, 2013). One exception is the study by Munch et al., (2002) who found a 
negative correlation between unemployment duration and home ownership in 
Denmark. However, the fact that Denmark is a relatively small country may 
diminish the importance of mobility. Another explanation to the puzzle, is the one 
of coexisting micro and macro level evidence as was further investigated by 
Laamanen (2013). It could be the case that home ownership has significant 
external effects that counteracts the possibly positive individual effects. No matter 
what mechanisms lie behind the findings it is sufficing to say that economies 
benefit from a highly mobile workforce and that housing markets that are not 
flexible enough will prevent workers to be mobile and move to where the jobs are. 
More empirical research is needed to further understand the linkages between the 
housing and labour market. 
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APPENDIX A 	  
Table 2.1: Former empirical research examining the Oswald hypothesis. Notes: MSAs is 
an abbreviation for Metropolitan Statistical Areas. 	  
Author and 
year 
Country Methodology Results Effect 
Blanchflower 
& Oswald, 
2013 
The US 
(states) 
Fixed effects panel 
model with data from 
1985 - 2011 
Long term elasticity 
between 1 and 2, doubled 
home ownership rate 
leads to more than 
doubled unemployment 
+ 
Cochrane & 
Poot, 2007 
 
New 
Zealand 
(regions) 
Fixed effects panel 
model with data from 
1986 - 2001, controls 
for simultaneity by 
using 5 years lagged 
home ownership 
rates as an explaining 
variable 
1 % rise of 
homeownership rate in a 
specific region increases 
unemployment with 0,2 % 
+ 
Coulson & 
Fisher. 2008 
The US 
(MSAs) 
Micro probit models Negative correlation - 
Flatau et al., 
2002 
Australia 
(regions) 
Probit micro level 
model 
Homeowners quicker to 
exit unemployment & are 
30 % less likely to be 
unemployed long term. 
- 
Flatau et al. 
2003 
Australia 
(regions) 
Probit micro level 
model 
Strong evidence for 
counter-Oswald results, 
leveraged owners tend to 
become reemployed faster 
than renters 
+/- 
Garcia & 
Hernandez, 
2004 
Spain 
(province
s) 
Cross-section Negative correlation 
 
- 
Glaeser & 
Shapiro, 
2003 
The US 
(MSAs) 
Cross-section on 
metropoles 
Negative correlation, 
higher home ownership 
leads to lower 
unemployment 
- 
Laamanen, 
2013 
Finland 
(labour 
districts) 
Micro probit model - 
models the 
probability for an 
individual being 
unemployed under a 
certain period, uses a 
reform as an 
instrument. 
1 % rise in 
homeownership rate in a 
specific region increases 
the risk of being in a 
period of unemployment 
with 
9 % 
+ 
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Author and 
year 
Country Methodology Results Effect 
Lerbs, 2010 Germany 
(regions) 
Panel model, Fixed 
effects 
Positive correlation, 10 % 
increase of home 
ownership rate leads to 
0.5 % increase of 
unemployment 
+/- 
Munch et al., 
2003 
Denmark Unemployment 
duration model, 
controlling for 
endogeneity of 
homeownerhsip 
Homeowners exit 
unemployment quicker 
- 
Taskin & 
Yaman, 2013 
USA Same as above Homeowners have longer 
unemployment spells 
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APPENDIX B 	  
Tables with full panel unit root test results: 	  
 
Table 4.6: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. 
                  Source: ABS 
 
 	  	  
Table 4.7: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                 Source: ABS 
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Table 4.8: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                  Source: ABS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                 Source: ABS 
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Table 4.10: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.11: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
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Table 4.12: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
 
 
 	  
Table 4.13: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
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Table 4.14: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.15: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
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Table 4.16: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews.  
                    Source: ABS 
 
 	  
Table 4.17: Panel unit root test results. Notes: calculations performed in EViews. 
                    Source: ABS 
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APPENDIX C 	  
Tables with full static and dynamic LSDV model results: 	  
Table 5.9: Static Panel least squares test results. Notes: calculations performed in     
EViews. Source: ABS 	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Table 5.10: Dynamic Panel least squares model results (1 LDV). Notes: calculations 
performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.11: Dynamic Panel least squares model results (2 LDV: s. Notes: calculations 
performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Tables with full panel GMM estimation results: 
 
Table 5.12: Panel GMM model results (1 lag model). Notes: calculations performed in 
EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.13: Panel GMM model results (2 lag model). Notes: calculations performed in 
EViews. Source: ABS 
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APPENDIX E 	  
Tables with full robustness checks results: 	  
Table 5.14: Instrument relevance test, first stage regressions for unemployment rates. 
Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 	  
 	  	  
Table 5.15: Instrument relevance test, first stage regressions for homeownership rates. 
Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.16: Panel GMM robustness check results (excluded instruments H(-3) and H(-4) 
included as regressors). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.17: Panel GMM robustness check results (additional instruments for 
homeownership rates). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.18: Panel GMM robustness check results (lagged differences instrumenting the 
LDV instead of lagged levels). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: 
ABS 
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Table 5.19: Panel GMM robustness check results (dropping the exogenous covariates (1 
lag model)). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.20: Panel GMM robustness check results (dropping the exogenous 
covariates (2 lag model)). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.21: Panel robustness check results (dropping the exogenous covariates (static 
model)). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.22: Panel robustness check results (using H(-2) and H(-4) as explanatory 
variables and treating them as exogenous, lagged levels instrument for the LDV). 
Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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Table 5.23: Panel robustness check results (using H(-2) and H(-4) as explanatory 
variables and treating them as exogenous, lagged differences instrument for the 
LDV). Notes: calculations performed in EViews. Source: ABS 
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